Dynamic Accumulation in Bargaining Games

In many bargaining situations the decisions that parties take at one point in time affect their future bargaining opportunities. We consider an ultimatum bargaining game in which parties can decide not only how to share a current surplus but also how much to invest in order to generate future surpluses. We show that there is a unique Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE) in which a proposer consumes the whole surplus not invested. Moreover, when the proposer has a sufficiently high discount factor, his MPE investment level is higher than his opponent’s, for a given capital stock. Finally, we show that bargaining can lead to overinvestment.

First Things First? The Agenda Formation Problem for Multi-issue Committees

It is often argued that multi-issue committees should discuss issues simultaneously to avoid ineciency. However, in practice, parties can be constrained to discuss issues sequentially and in this case, existing game-theoretical models give inconclusive results: either parties have dierent preferences over agendas or they are indierent. We show that when there is an important issue, parties have the same preferences over agendas, in particular they prefer to discuss the most important issue Þrst. Moreover, when an issue is dicult/urgent (in the sense that the rejection of a proposal on this issue implies a game breakdown with a positive probability) parties prefer to postpone the negotiations over the dicult/urgent issue. We highlight several incentives that players need to take into account in forming their preferences over agendas. Since theseareoften in conßict, the existence of a Pareto optimal agenda is of particular interest.

Strategic Effects and Incentives in Multi-issue Bargaining Games

The focus of the paper is on issue-by-issue bargaining procedures in which parties are allowed to differ not only in their valuations of the issues but also in their rates of time-preference. We show that the interplay of the forces in the bargaining game is complex and standard assumptions in the literature, such as a common discount factor, can be strong. We investigate the SPE of the game when the order of the issues can be changed and show that parties can have the same preferences over agendas when they both agree over the importance of an issue or when they disagree (if corner solutions are allowed and/or there is a difficult/urgent issue).

Long-run Negotiations withDynamic Accumulation

TMany negotiations are characterised by dynamic accumulation: current agreements affect future bargaining possibilities. We study such situations by using repeated bargaining games in which two parties can decide how much to invest and how to share the residual surplus for their own consumption. We show that there is a unique (stationary) Markov Perfect Equilibrium characterised by immediate agreement. Moreover, in equilibrium a relatively more patient party invests more than his opponent. However, being more patient can make a player worse off. In addition, we derive the conditions under which we obtain an efficient investment path. Our results are robust to different bargaining procedures, different rates of time preference and elasticities of substitution.exports; control function; GMM; matching; TFP; sample selection

Political conflict and bargaining in a new Keynesian model of fiscal stabilization

Recent work on optimal monetary and fiscal policy in New Keynesian models has tended to focus on policy set by an infinitely lived benevolent policy maker, often with access to a commitment technology. In this paper, we explore deviations from this ideal, by allowing (time-consistent) policy to be set by a process of bargaining between two political players with different weights on elements of the social welfare function. We characterize the (linear) Markov perfect equilibrium and, in a series of numerical examples, we explore the resultant policy response to shocks which cannot be perfectly offset with the available instruments due to their fiscal consequences. We find that, even although the players, on average, have the socially desirable objective function, the process of bargaining implies an outcome which deviates from the time-consistent policy chosen by the benevolent policy maker. Moreover, the range of instruments available mean that policy makers will bargain across the entire policy mix, sometimes implying outcomes which are quite different from those that would be chosen by a single policy maker. These policy outcomes depend crucially on the nature of the conflict and also the level of government debt

Divide and invest: bargaining in a dynamic framework

Many negotiations (for instance, among political parties or partners in a business) are characterized by dynamic bargaining: current agreements affect future bargaining possibilities. We study such situations using bargaining games á la Rubinstein (Econometrica 50:97–109, 1982), with the novelty that players can decide how much to invest, as well as how to share the residual surplus for their own consumption. Their investment decisions affect the size of the next surplus. In line with the existing literature, we focus on Markov Perfect Equilibria, where consumption and investment are linear time-invariant functions of capital and show that standard results in bargaining theory can be overturned. For instance, a more patient proposer may consume less than his opponent. The intuition is that when capital is productive, both parties have incentives to invest, however, the most patient party wishes to invest significantly more than his opponent. Then, to prioritize investment—which affects future bargaining possibilities—the former must make larger concessions and let the latter consume more. Another interesting result is that if a player becomes more patient, both parties may reduce their investment. The key underlying driver of this result is that when counteroffers become cheaper for an impatient party, he is able to reduce his investment and consume more. This forces his opponent to make larger concessions (and reduce his investment plan). Moreover, extreme demands (where a player consumes all the residual surplus) are possible in equilibrium, under fairly modest assumptions. Finally, only when bargaining is frictionless, is the equilibrium efficient

Antibacterial activity of Tuscan Artemisia annua essential oil and its major components against some foodborne pathogens

Recently, the attention of researchers regarding Artemisia annua has been focused on the antimicrobial activity of the essential oil. This oil, rich in mono- and sesquiterpenes, has a strong activity against some Gram-negative and Gram-positive bacteria. The aim of our study is to further contribute to the knowledge of the antibacterial activity of an Artemisia annua essential oil collected in Tuscany and its three most represented compounds (artemisia ketone, 1,8-cineole and camphor). The essential oil obtained by hydrodistillation gave a yield of 0.37% (w/w fresh plant material). The composition of the essential oil extracted from flowering aerial parts was determined by gas chromatography (GC/FID and GC/MS). The essential oil and compounds were tested for activity against Escherichia coli O157, Salmonella Enteritidis, Salmonella Typhi, Yersinia enterocolitica and Listeria monocytogenes, all of which have great significance in foodborne infections. The antibacterial activity was tested using disk diffusion method and broth microdilution assay. The microorganisms tested were all sensitive to the A. annua essential oil in toto and to all its components, which often have lower activity than oil in toto

Cannabis sativa and Humulus lupulus essential oils as novel control tools against the invasive mosquito Aedes albopictus and fresh water snail Physella acuta

Over the past several decades, there has been a resurgence of interest in industrial hemp (Cannabis sativa L., Cannabaceae) cultivation. Besides fibre, seeds and oil, hemp contains high quantity of essential oil (EO). Hop (Humulus lupulus L., Cannabaceae) is a high-climbing, perennial vine, largely utilized in the brewing industry to add flavour and bitterness to beer. While it is known that hop also contains α- and ß-acids, and terpenes that have been found to be toxic, anti-feedant, and repellent for insects and mites, little is known about the bioactivity against problematic species of the hemp EO. In this study, the chemical composition of the EOs from C. sativa and H. lupulus was evaluated by GC-MS, and their acute toxicity was assessed against the Asian tiger mosquito Aedes albopictus (Skuse) (Diptera Culicidae) and, the freshwater bladder snail Physella acuta (Draparnaud) (Mollusca Physidae), two problematic invasive species. Furthermore, we evaluated the toxicity of both EOs against a non-target insect, the mayfly Cloeon dipterum L. (Ephemeroptera Baetidae). Both EOs were toxic against the three tested species. The most effective EO was the C. sativa, able to kill 100% of P. acuta snails starting from 100 μL L-1. C. sativa LC50 were 301.560, 282.174 and, 35.370 μL L-1, while H. lupulus LC50 were 330.855, 219.787 and, 118.653 μL L-1 against A. albopictus, C. dipterum and P. acuta, respectively. Relative median potency analysis showed that the C. sativa EO was more toxic than H. lupulus against A. albopictus and P. acuta, while H. lupulus was more toxic than C. sativa EO against C. dipterum. The most susceptible species to the two EOs was P. acuta, while A. albopictus resulted the least susceptible one